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I. INTRODUCTION
Family autonomy, with its concomitant parental authority,
is an aspect of family privacy that American law has protected for
several generations. At least for most of the last century, the rights
of natural parents to be free, for the most part, from state
intervention in relationships with their children was recognized
generally as state policy. Also, the law afforded substantial and
significant constitutional protection to parental rights. The
Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law,
Hofstra University. I am grateful to Lisa Spar of the Hofstra Law Library for
invaluable research assistance and to Sheila Shoob for the application of her
superb secretarial skills during the preparation of this article.
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common law neither countenanced nor contemplated intervention
in parent-child relationships by persons who were not related to the
child by blood. Even grandparents, who not only are blood
relatives, but also are often considered to be members of the
extended family, were considered legal strangers who enjoyed no
rights under the common law with respect to their grandchildren.
This Article addresses the ways in which the lawprimarily state law-has significantly redefined the American
family in its response to third-party claims against parents for
visitation rights with the children of those parents. Part II briefly
addresses statutory and case law relating to visitation by
grandparents, the most favored group of petitioners for visitation
rights, and stepparents who have not fared nearly as well. After
placing third-party visitation in its constitutional context, Part II
also examines how the courts have treated "coparent" claims of a
right to visitation, brought by former companions of natural
parents who insist that they are de facto parents, parents by
estoppel, psychological parents, and the like. It describes and
analyzes the evolving law in this area from the earliest decisions
when such coparent claims were routinely rejected, to the most
recent cases, several of which have recognized such claims without
any readily apparent statutory authority.
Part III, summarizes the several opinions in Troxel v.
Granville,' the first third-party visitation case (in this instance
concerning grandparents) that the United States Supreme Court has
decided.2 Finally, Part III also reviews some state court decisions
subsequent to Troxel, and assesses whether the Supreme Court's
decision has had or is likely to have any significant impact on state
law in the areas of grandparent or other third-party visitation
rights.

1. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
2.
The Supreme Court's silence with respect to the issue of third party
visitation may be surprising in light of the welter of statutes and judicial
observations on the subject. See generally John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A
Rationalefor Child Visitation by Legal Strangers,55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351
(1998); John DeWitt Gregory, Whose Child Is It, Anyway: The Demise of
Family Autonomy and ParentalAuthority, 33 FAM. L.Q. 833 (1999).
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THE CONVENTIONAL LEGAL TREATMENT OF THIRD-PARTY

VISITATION CLAIMS

A. Stepparents and Grandparents
Petitions for rights of visitation by stepparents generally
arise in one of two contexts. In a number of cases, the stepparent's
marriage to the child's natural parent has ended in divorce. In other
cases, the
stepparent seeks visitation after the death of the custodial
3
parent.
Statutes in every state give grandparents standing to
petition for rights to visitation under a variety of circumstances. 4 In
about one-third of the states, statutes either provide explicit
authority for stepparent visitation or contain language authorizing5
third-party visitation that is broad enough to apply to stepparents.
These statutes are a mixed bag at best. They do not take a uniform
approach and are frequently unclear. In only a handful of
jurisdictions do the statutes contain explicit provisions that address
stepparent visitation, 6 and most of them authorize both grandparent
and stepparent visitation claims. 7 The Kansas statute, for example,
states that "[g]randparents and stepparents may be granted
visitation rights." 8 The statutory language in Oregon is couched in
far broader terms, affording standing to petition or intervene in
custody or visitation proceedings to anyone "who has established
3.
See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILmS AND THE LAW 129
(discussing stepparent visitation right disputes).
4.
See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 n.1.
5.
See MAHONEY, supra note 3 at 130 (citing Elaine D. Ingulli,
Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87 W. VA. L.
REV. 295 (1985)).
6.
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1616 (1994 & Supp. 1996); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (West 1999);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(VI) (1992 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.119(1) (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303 (2001); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-241 (Michie 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 2001).
7.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(VI) (1992 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.119(1) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 2001).
8.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship ... with a child"
and expressly including, among others, stepparents and
grandparents. 9 The Louisiana statute, unlike any of the others,
gives
identical
visitation
rights
to
stepparents
and
0
stepgrandparents. 1
Not surprisingly, all of the statutes contain, either expressly
or implicitly, the overall requirement that visitation be in the best
interest of the child."I In addition, some state laws impose
additional conditions for the court to grant a third-party's petition
for visitation. Under the statute in Virginia, for example, a
petitioner for visitation must have a "legitimate interest."'1 2 Among
those who can satisfy this statutory requirement are stepparents,
former stepparents, grandparents, and other family members and
blood relatives. 13 The statute in Tennessee requires not only that
visitation be in the child's best interest, but also, as a condition of
granting visitation rights, that the stepparent provide or contribute
to the support of the child. 14
In several states, while the statutes do not expressly provide
for stepparent visitation, they are broad enough to give stepparents
standing to seek court awarded visitation.1 5 In Alaska, for example,
the court may order visitation by a child's grandparent "or other
person if that is in the best interests of the child." 16 The
Connecticut statute permits the court to grant visitation "to a third
9. OR. REV. STAT. §109.119(1) (2001).
10.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (West 1999).
11.
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101(a) (West 1994) (describing best
interest of the child as always critical). The California statute provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may grant reasonable
visitation to a stepparent, if visitation by the stepparent is determined to be in the
best interest of the minor child." Id.
12.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Michie 2000).
13.
Id. § 20-124.1.
14.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303(a) (2001).
15.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-803(C) (West Supp. 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(a) (West
1995 & West Supp. 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (1999); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.022(2b) (West 1998 & West Supp. 2002); Mo. STAT. § 452.375
(West Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(a) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.05(B)(1) (West 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West
1997).
16.
ALASKA STAT. § 2 5.24.150(a) (Michie 2000).
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party, including but not limited to, grandparents." 1 7 Finally, almost
any party with a close relationship with the child may request
visitation in Arizona under the statute that governs paternity and
maternity proceedings.' 8
There are relatively few reported cases that involve
stepparent visitation, especially when compared with the number
that address visitation by grandparents. Although the courts have
not always been consistent in granting visitation to stepparents, for
the most part they have found one rationale or another for doing
so. Similarly, in the case of so-called lesbian coparents, courts
have granted visitation even when the applicable visitation statute
provides no basis for doing so.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania appears to be the first
appellate court to render a decision addressing stepparent visitation
rights. In Spells v. Spells,' 9 the court found that the best interest of
the child was the primary concern in disputes between natural
parents and stepparents. The court stated:
It is our belief that a step[parent] may not be
denied the right to visit his stepchildren merely
because of his lack of a blood relationship to them.
Clearly, a step[parent] and his young stepchildren
who live in a family environment may develop deep
and lasting mutual bonds of affection. Courts must
acknowledge the fact that a stepfather (or
stepmother) may be the only parent that the child
has truly known and loved during its minority. A
stepparent may be as devoted and concerned about
the welfare of a stepchild as a natural parent would
be. Rejection of visitation privileges cannot be

17.
18.

CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56(a) (West 1995 & West Supp. 2001).
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-803(A) (West Supp. 2001). The Arizona

Court of Appeals has limited the statutory language in two respects. In Hughes
v. Creighton, 798 P.2d 403, 405-06 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), the court first denied
visitation to a party who had not established paternity; and second, the court
limited visitation rights to noncustodial parents, grandparents, greatgrandparents, and stepparents, despite the fact that the plaintiff's relationship
with the child was in loco parentis. Id.
19.
378 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 32

20
grounded in the mere status as a stepparent.

Accordingly, the court remanded the matter for the trial
court to decide whether it would be in the best interests 2of
the
1
stepfather.
their
to
rights
visitation
grant
to
involved
children
The rationale that courts have relied on most frequently in
granting visitation rights to stepparents is the in loco parentis
doctrine, together with the essential requisite that visitation must
be in the best interests of the child. 22 Some courts, however, have
not required any in loco parentis requirement and have considered
only what is in the best interest of the child in deciding stepparent
visitation cases.23 Typical of this latter approach is the decision of
24
the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals in Shoemaker v. Shoemaker.
The court found no common law or legislatively granted right of 25a
former stepparent to enjoy visitation with a former stepchild.
Nevertheless, because there was no statutory bar to granting
visitation rights to a former stepchild, the court held that a trial
court could grant visitation when such visitation would be in the
child's best interests. 26 It should be noted, however, that the court
expressly limited the question of when visitation would be in the
child's best interests. The court stated:
It may be questioned whether the best interests
of a child would be served if the exercise of
visitation by a former stepparent was against the
wishes of the natural parent .... To force a former
stepparent's (legally a mere "non-parent") visitation
upon a natural parent or the former stepchild, over
either's objection, would appear to be a detriment to
the best interests of the child.27
20.
Id. at 881.
21.
Id. at 883-84.
22.
See generally Gregory, supra note 2; see also Gregory, supra note 2
at 364, n. 111 (citing stepparent visitation cases in which petitioning stepparents'
in loco parentis relationship with the child is a relevant factor).
23.
Id. at 364 & n.112.
24.
563 So. 2d 1032 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
25.
Id. at 1034.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
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Accordingly, the court in Shoemaker denied visitation
rights to the former stepparent in the absence of a showing that
those rights would advance the best interests of the child.28
Decisions by appellate courts in both Florida 29 and Maryland 30 are
consistent with the view in Shoemaker that the best interests of the
child are the paramount concern in stepparent visitation cases.
A reading of the cases confirms the view of stepparent
visitation cases that Professor Katharine Bartlett voiced more than
a decade and a half ago. 31 Professor Bartlett observed:
The few courts that have awarded stepparent
visitation or stepparent custody have had to strain
both common and statutory law to reach such
results. In visitation cases, courts sometimes have
disregarded the absence of a statute granting
visitation rights to nonparents and have assumed
jurisdiction to allow such visitation simply because
the stepparent had physical custody of the child at
the date of the petition for custody or visitation.
Other courts have invoked the in loco parentis
doctrine, ignoring the common law rule that such
with the dissolution of the stepparent's
status ends
32
marriage.

Id.
28.
See Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
29.
(finding that when the record shows that visitation is in the child's best interest,
the trial court's discretion is broad enough to grant an order of visitation with a
nonparent).
See Evans v. Evans, 488 A.2d 157, 162 (Md. 1985) ("While an in
30.
loco parentis status may affect the court's determination as to the best interests
of the child, that relationship need not exist under Maryland law before
visitation rights may be granted."); See also Rhinehart v. Nowlin, 805 P.2d 88,
92-93 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that trial courts have power and
discretion to grant visitation rights to stepmother when such rights are in best
interests of children).
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive
31.
Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear
Family Has Failed,70 VA. L. REv. 879, 912-19 (1984).
32.
Id. at 914-15 (citations omitted).
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The courts have been far more receptive to visitation
petitions by grandparents. At common law, grandparents enjoyed
no greater rights to visitation than other legal strangers. Now,
however, benefited by statutes in every state, grandparents occupy
the most favored position among groups that seek visitation rights
with children who are not their own offspring. 33 A leading
academic commentator has stated that, "[slince these statutes are
the product of a combination of the lobbying efforts of grandparent
groups and the sentimentality of the state legislatures, they take so
many different forns and limit visitation to so many kinds of
circumstances that it is extremely difficult to classify them." 34 The
statutes vary significantly in both language and the scope of the
rights they provide. The single common element among these
grandparent visitation statutes is that almost all of them, like the
third-party visitation statutes just discussed, either explicitly or
implicitly are based on the best interests of the child.
In some instances, the language of the governing provisions
are so broad as to permit a court to award visitation rights to
grandparents whenever the court finds that it would be in the
child's best interests. 35 Another group of statutes requires that
before the courts grant visitation rights, the grandparent and the
child must have established a substantial relationship. 36 The unique
New York provision allows grandparents to petition for visitation
"where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity
would see fit to intervene." 37 A few statutes, however, prohibit
visitation rights when granting them would interfere with the

33.
See Catherine A. McCrimmon & Robert J. Howell, Grandparents'
Legal Rights to Visitation in the Ffty States and the District of Columbia, 17
BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 355, 355-56 (1989) (observing that

"access to grandparents, regardless of other legal situations, is not considered
the child's legal right").
34.

HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE

UNITED STATES § 19.7, at 828 (2d ed. 1988) (citation omitted).
35.

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1995); HAW. REv.

STAT. § 571-46(7) (Michie 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Coop. Supp.2001).

36. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-129(a) (1994).
37.

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1999).
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parent-child relationship.
In still another variation, some statutes set out limiting
circumstances that must exist before a court may permit
grandparent visitation. For example, statutory provisions in some
jurisdictions permit grandparent visitation when the child's parents
are divorced or in the process of divorcing, 39 or when one or both
of the child's parents has died.4 0 Legislative enactments in a few
states recognize grandparent petitions in cases in which a court has
41
terminated the parental rights of either parent or both parents.
Grandparents in still other states may seek court ordered visitation
when they have been denied visitation unreasonably for a specific
length of time,42 or when the grandparent and the child have lived
together for a time period defined by the statute. 3
For the most part, state courts have routinely apPlied
statutory mandates relating to visitation by grandparents. In
recent years, however, the statutes have come under attack in
several jurisdictions, by both natural parents opposing visitation
and grandparents alleging that visitation was improperly denied. In
both kinds of litigation, the parties, in the context of opposing
arguments as to whether visitation was in the best interest of the
child, have relied on state constitutions and the United States
Constitution. The decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
King v. King,4 5 granting a petition for grandparent visitation rights
38. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(1) (West 1998); NEB. REv. STAT. § 431802(2) (1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311 (West 2001).
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (Michie 2000); GA. CODE
39.
ANN. § 19-7-3(b) (1999).
40.
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117(1)(c) (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 752.01(1)(d) (West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3(1) (2001);
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.433(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
41.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b) (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9316-3(1) (2001).
See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402(1)(3) (West 1997).
42.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2(C)-(D) (Michie 1999); 23 PA.
43.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5313(a) (2001).
See, e.g., Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)
44.
(upholding grandparent visitation statute because "it is rationally related to
furthering the legitimate state interest in fostering relationships between
grandparents and their grandchildren").
828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992).
45.
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over the constitutionally based opposition of a child's parents, is an
early and clear example.46
In King, the child's paternal grandfather sought visitation
with his female granddaughter after the child's married parents,
because of a family dispute, denied the grandfather's request for
visitation with the child. The Kentucky Supreme Court identified
two issues in the case: first, whether the governing statute, under
which a court could grant reasonable visitation to a grandparent if
visitation was in the child's best interest, was unconstitutional, and
second, whether the trial court's finding that the grandparent's
visitation was in the child's best interest was erroneous.
The lower court upheld the statute on both constitutional
grounds and as a matter of state policy and summarily rejected the
parents' contention that "the statute . .
constitute[d] an
unwarranted intrusion into the liberty interest of parents to rear
their children as they see fit."' 49 The parents' argument rested on
the long line of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
that protect family autonomy and parental authority. Time and
again, beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska,5 ' where the Court
explicitly recognized the right "to marry, establish a home and
bring up children" as a "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court has given strong support to family
autonomy. 52 Further endorsing this principle in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,53 the Court, in the course of its decision enjoining the
enforcement of the Oregon Compulsory Education law against two
private educational institutions, stated:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we
think it entirely plain that the [statute] unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children
46.
47.

Id. at 633.
Id. at 630-31.

48.

Id. at 631.

49.
50.

Id. at 631.
Id. at 631-32.

51.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

52.

Id. at 399 (1923).

53.

268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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under their control. As often heretofore pointed out,
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State ....

The child is not the mere creature of

the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize
and prepare him for additional
54
obligations.
In its decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,55 some fifty years
after Meyer and Pierce, the Court affirmed a Wisconsin judgment
overturning the criminal conviction of Old Order Amish parents
for violations of the state's compulsory education law. 56 The Court
in Yoder, referring to Pierce as "perhaps the most significant
statements of the Court in this area," 57 stated:
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of
parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide
the religious future and education of their children.
The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the
nurture and upbringing of their children. This... is
now established beyond
debate as an enduring
58
American tradition.
In subsequent decisions the Court has, again and again,
authority and reaffirmed the principle of family
endorsed parental
59
autonomy.
54.

Id. at 534-35 (citation omitted).

406 U.S. 205 (1972).
55.
56.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
57.
Id. at 232.
58.
Id.
59.
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (holding that
natural parents are entitled to due process at state initiated parental rights
termination proceedings); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 84749 (1977) (setting out required procedures for removing children from foster
homes); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645-46 (1974)
(holding that mandatory termination proceedings against pregnant public school
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These constitutional precedents did not persuade the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in King v. King.60 Citing Meyer v.
Nebraska with seeming approval, the court purported to recognize
"the right to rear children without undue governmental
interference. ' 6 1The court in King insisted, however, that the "right
must provide
under the law, parents
is not inviolate,"
• • ,noting that,
•
62
•.
for their children's education. The court also cited laws requiring
inoculation of children against disease, restraint of children in
motor vehicles, and regulation of children with respect to
employment. 63 Having thus disposed summarily of constitutional
arguments, the Kentucky court turned to the Kentucky grandparent
visitation statute before it and, in language that would be risible if
there were less at stake, concluded:
This statute seeks to balance the fundamental
rights of the parents, grandparents and the child. At
common law, grandparents had no legal right to
visitation. However, the General Assembly
determined that, in modern day society, it was
essential that some semblance of family and
generational contact be preserved. If a grandparent
is physically, mentally and morally fit, then a
grandchild will ordinarily benefit from contact with
and
grandparent.
That
grandparents
the
grandchildren normally have a special bond cannot
be denied. Each benefits from contact with the
other. The child can learn respect, a sense of
teachers violate due process); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972)
(holding that state statute that allows removal of children from unwed father's
custody upon death of mother violates father's due process rights); May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953) (holding that a Wisconsin decree does not
bind an Ohio court in habeas corpus proceeding attacking the rights of the
mother to retain possession of minor children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that certain areas of family life exist which the
state cannot enter); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding
that state statute providing for sterilization of criminals violates their rights).
60.
828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992).

61.

Id. at 631.

62.
63.

Id.

Id.
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responsibility and love. The grandparent can be
invigorated by exposure to youth, can gain an
insight into our changing society, and can avoid the
loneliness which is so often a part of an aging
parent's life. These considerations by the state do
not go too far in intruding
into the fundamental
64
rights of the parents.
Accordingly, the court held that the Kentucky statute was
constitutional and that visitation was in the best interests of the
child.65
A dissenting judge in King accurately and eloquently
described the opinion of the court's majority:
The opinion of the majority makes little
pretense of constitutional analysis but depends
entirely on the sentimental notion of an inherent
value in visitation between grandparent and
grandchild, regardless of the wishes of the parents.
The fatal flaw in the majority opinion is its
conclusion that a grandparent has a "fundamental
right" Ito visitation with a grandchild. No authority
is cited for this proposition as there is no such
right.66
While King is among the most blatant examples of judicial
trampling on the constitutional privacy rights of fit parents, it is
certainly not the only case in which a state's highest court has
rendered a visitation! decision supporting grandparents while
ignoring or evading the parental autonomy principles enunciated
by the Supreme Court. In Herndon v. Tuhey, 67 for example, the
Supreme Court of Missouri upheld as constitutional a state statute
permitting the court to grant reasonable visitation rights to a
grandparent if visitation was denied unreasonably for more than

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 632 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 633 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
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ninety days. 6 8 The statute in Herndon required that the court
determine whether visitation would be in the child's best interest,
endanger the child's physical health, or impair the child's
emotional development. The statute permitted the court to grant
visitation only "when the court finds such visitation to be in the
best interests of the child., 70 The court declared that the statute was
constitutional, rejecting the parents' reliance upon their "basic
constitutional right to raise their children as they see 7fit,
free from
1
child.",
the
to
harm
of
showing
a
absent
state intrusion
The Missouri court, after acknowledging the parents'
constitutional right "to make decisions affecting the family,"
rejected their argument on the ground that "the magnitude of the
infringement by the state is a significant consideration in
determining whether a statute will be struck down as
unconstitutional. 72 The court cited King with approval and quoted
a long portion of the Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion. The
court concluded:
Missouri's statute is reasonable both because it
contemplates only a minimal intrusion on the family
relationship and because it is narrowly tailored to
adequately protect the interests of parents and
children .... A court may grant visitation only if it
will be in the best interest of the child. If visitation
would endanger the child physically, mentally, or
emotionally then visitation must be denied.73
The court's reasoning in Herndon, as in King on which it
heavily relied, evoked a strong dissent. The author of the
dissenting opinion observed that "[t]he majority opinion's holding
rests in actuality upon a trial court's discretion, rather than upon
traditional principles of constitutional analysis. 74 The dissent
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 206-08.
Id. at 207.
Id. (citing Mo.
Id. at 207.

ANN. STAT.

§ 452.402 (West 1997)).

72.

Id. at 208.

73.
74.

Id. at 210.
Id. at 211 (Covington, J., dissenting).
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concluded that "[a] best interest test standing alone does not justify
intrusion into the parents' constitutionally protected right of
autonomy in child rearing. 75
76
The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Michael v. Hertzler,
upheld that state's grandparent visitation statute with reasoning
that is at least as troubling as the analyses in King and Herndon.
The statute under attack permitted a grandparent to bring an
original action against a minor grandchild's custodian.77 The bases
for such an action included the death or divorce of the
grandparent's child who is the parent and custodian of the minor
child and that custodian's refusal to permit reasonable visitation to
the grandparent, or the grandchild's residence with the grandparent
for more than six consecutive months and the refusal of visitation
after the child's return to the custodial parents. 78 If either of these
bases existed, the court was authorized to grant visitation to the
grandparents so long as visitation would be in the best interests of
the child and would not substantially impair the rights of the
79
parents.
Typically, the court acknowledged that parental rights are
fundamental and, therefore, the constitutional standard to be
applied was strict scrutiny. The court also acknowledged that the
father's right to raise his child was a constitutionally protected
liberty interest. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the statute was
constitutional in light of the state's compelling interest in
protecting the best interests of the child. 82 The court concluded:
Following the lead of the courts of our sister
75. Id.
76.
900 P.2d 1144, 1145 (Wyo. 1995).
77.
Id. at 1146 (citing Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101(a) (Michie 1994)
(amended 1997)).
78.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1994) (amended 1997).
79.
Id.The Wyoming legislature has since amended this statute. See
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1994). The amended provision retains the
best interest child standard but has eliminated the language describing specific
conditions under which grandparents may initiate an action for visitation rights.

Id.
80.
81.
82.

Michael, 900 P.2d at 1146.
Id. at 1147.
Id.at 1148-49, 1151.
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jurisdictions, we perceive a compelling state interest
in the State of Wyoming which justifies the
grandparent visitation statute, perhaps more so. The
statute specifically adopts the best interest of the
child as a standard which we perceive as
representing a compelling
state interest in the state's
83
patriae.
role as parens
The court went on to state, "in addition to the compelling
state interest attaching to the best interest of the children, the
compelling state interest exists in maintaining
the right of
8' 4
association of grandparents and grandchildren. "
In Martin v. Coop, 85 the Supreme 'Court of Mississippi
considered a visitation petition under a statute permitting either
parent of the deceased parent of a child to petition for visitation
with the child. 86 The court rejected the surviving parent's assertion
that the statute was unconstitutional and held that it "[did] not
deprive the parents of their right to raise their children by
determining the care, custody and management of the child. 87
Not all courts are as solicitous of the claims mounted by
grandparents against the rights of children's natural parents as the
courts in Kentucky and Missouri. Indeed, the highest courts in
some jurisdictions have viewed grandparent visitation statutes with
as much distaste as the dissenters in King and Herndon. The
decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Hawk v. Hawk,88
which held that Tennessee's grandparent visitation statute was
unconstitutional, is a leading case in this respect.
In Hawk, after a number of family disputes, the parents of
two minor children ended the children's visitation with their
paternal grandparents. 89 The grandparents sued for visitation under
the Tennessee statute that authorized the court to order a minor
child's reasonable visitation with grandparents after determining
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1151.
693 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1997).
See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3(1) (1994 rev. ed.).

87.
88.
89.

Martin, 693 So. 2d at 915.
855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1993).
Id. at 575.
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that visitation was in the child's best interests. 90 The trial court
ordered liberal visitation finding that family disputes should not
relationship between the grandparents and their
interfere with 9the
1
grandchildren.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the trial court's
decision because the statute violated the parents' right to privacy
under the Tennessee Constitution "as applied to [a] married couple,
whose fitness as parents is unchallenged. 92 Although the court
based its decision on the state constitution, it observed that "the
right to rear one's children is so firmly rooted in our culture that
the United States Supreme Court has held it to be a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution." 93
The court in Hawk reviewed Supreme Court decisions at
considerable length and concluded that while "often expressed as a
'liberty' interest, the protection of 'childrearing autonomy' reflects
94
the Court's larger concern with privacy rights for the family."
Also, the court rejected the grandparents' argument that a finding
that visitation is in a child's best interests creates a compelling
state interest that outweighs objections to visitation by a fit
parent.95 Rather, the court read both federal cases and Tennessee
cases and statutory law as requiring that state interference with the
parent's right to raise children be based on a finding of harm to the
welfare of the child. 96 The court concluded:
[W]ithout a substantial danger of harm to the child,
a court may not constitutionally impose its own
subjective notions of the "best interests of the child"
when an intact, nuclear family with fit, married
parents is involved. By holding that an initial
showing of harm to a child is necessary before the
state may intervene to determine the "best interests
90.

Id. at 576.

91.

Id. at 577.

92.
93.

Id. (citing TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8).
Id. at 578.

94.

Id. (citation omitted).

95.
96.

Id. at 579.
Id. at 580-81.
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of the child," we approve the reasoning of both
Tennessee and federal cases that have balanced
various state interests against parental privacy
rights.97
Subsequently, in Simmons-v. Simmons,98 the Tennessee
Supreme Court applied the principles in Hawk to a case in which
the paternal grandparents of a child sought visitation rights over
the objections of the child's mother and adopting father. The court
repudiated the grandparents' assertion that constitutional protection
of family privacy and parental rights was "limited to married,
natural parents who have maintained continuous custody of their
children and whose fitness as parents has not been challenged." 99
Consistent with the Tennessee Supreme Court's holdings in
Hawk and Simmons, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in Brooks v.
Parkerson,100 struck down Georgia's grandparent visitation statute
on constitutional grounds. 0 1 The statute permitted court
intervention to "grant any grandparent ...reasonable visitation
rights upon proof of special circumstances which make such
visitation rights necessary to the best interests of the child." 10 2 The
court held that the statute was unconstitutional under both the
federal and state constitutions "because it does not clearly promote
the health or welfare of the child and does not require a showing of
harm before state interference is authorized."' 1 3 In Herbst v.
Sayre,1°4 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma cited and relied upon
Brooks to buttress its conclusion that Oklahoma's grandparent
visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied in a case that
97.
Id. at 579-80.
98.
900 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn 1995).
99.
Id. at 684; see also Ellison v. Ellison, 994 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1999).
100.
454 S.E.2d 769, 790 (Ga. 1995).
101.
Id. at 774.
102.
Id. at 770-71 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(c) (1988). Georgia
has since amended the visitation statute to permit visitation rights for
grandparents when a "court finds the health or welfare of the child would be
harmed unless such visitation is granted, and if the best interests of the child
would be served by such visitation." GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(c) (1999)).
103.
Id. at 774.
104.
971 P.2d 395 (Okla. 1998).
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involved neither harm nor threatened harm to the child, nor
unfitness on the parents' part. 10 5 The Oklahoma court concluded:
Herbst argues for an application of [the statute]
which effectively strips parents of the right to make
the decisions regarding grandparental visitation and
their own children. Any conflict between the
fundamental, constitutional right of parents to care
for their children as they see fit and the statutorily
created right of grandparental visitation must be
reconciled in favor of the preservation of the
parents' constitutional rights. The relationship
between parent and child must be held
paramount. 106
10 7
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Beagle v. Beagle,
struck down as unconstitutional an amendment to the state's
grandparent visitation statute that required the court to award
reasonable visitation rights to grandparents over a natural parent's
objection if visitation would be in the child's best interest, without
regard to whether the relationship between the child's parents and
grandparents was broken.10 8 The court, noting that "[o]ur cases
have made it abundantly clear that the State can satisfy the
compelling state interest standard when it acts to prevent
demonstrable harm to a child," held that the amended statute was
unconstitutional because it did not show such a compelling state
interest. 1°9 Again, in Hoff v. Berg,110 the Supreme Court of North
Dakota declared the state's grandparent visitation statute
unconstitutional. Virginia's highest court, in Williams v.
Williams, 11' reached a similar result after review of a statute that

105.
Id. at 398-99.
106.
Id. at 399.
107.
678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996); see also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d
510 (Fla. 1998).
108.
Beagle, 678 So. 2d. at 1273 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01(1)(e)
(West 1997)).
109.
Id. at 1276.
110.
595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1999).
111.
501 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 1998).
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permitted visitation by grandparents and other non-parents. l l 2 The
court stated:
In essence, [the statute] as applied in this
proceeding, permits the government to impose its
views regarding how a child should be raised upon
a child's parents, even though such decisions are
parental choices protected by the parents'
fundamental rights emanating from the Fourteenth
Amendment. [The statute] as applied here, is
constitutionally deficient because it does not require
that a court, in awarding visitation to the
grandparents, make a determination that such
visitation is necessary to protect the safety or health
of the child." 3
Simply stated, in several of the more recent grandparent
visitation cases, a number of state courts have placed a
constitutionally required limit on grandparents' visitation rights
that impair family privacy by threatening family autonomy and the
rights of fit parents to raise their children. Considering themselves
bound by long-standing constitutional principles, these courts
decline to rely solely and entirely on the best interests of the child
doctrine as controlling or outweighing family privacy principles in
grandparent visitation cases.
B. Other Non-Parents
During the last decade or so, a third group of suitors, who
may be denominated as "lesbian coparents" have asserted claims
of the right of visitation. These claimants have sought legal
recognition of relationships with children that are based, unlike
those of stepparents or grandparents, upon neither marriage nor
blood. The facts set out by the New York Court of Appeals in
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 1 14 the first such case decided by a state's
highest court, are both illustrative and prototypic.

112.
113.
114.

See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (Michie 2000).
Williams, 501 S.E.2d at 424.
572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
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The parties in Alison D., having begun a relationship and
lived together for a period of time, decided to have a child. They
agreed that Virginia M. would be artificially inseminated and that
they would participate together in raising the child. 116 After the
child's birth, Alison D. shared in birth related expenses and child
support and cooperated with Virginia M. in providing child care
and making parental decisions.' 17 After two years and four months,
the parties separated, and Virginia M., the natural mother, cut off
Alison D.'s visitation with the child. Alison D. commenced a
lawsuit seeking visitation rights.1 l 8 The New York Court of
Appeals, in an opinion that emphasized the fact that Alison D. was
not the child's natural parent, refused to recognize her asserted
right to visitation. 1 9 The court, interpreting the governing statute,
observed:
Traditionally, in this State it is the child's
mother and father who, assuming fitness, have the
right to the care and custody of their child, even in
situations where the nonparent has exercised some
control over the child with the parents' consent....
To allow the courts to award visitation-a limited
form of custody-to a third person would
necessarily impair the parents' right to custody and
control. 2 0
Accordingly, the court dismissed Alison D.'s claims of legal
parentage and for visitation rights.
The New York Court of Appeals was not the first court to
consider and reject a claim for visitation by a former partner of the
115.
116.

Id. at 28.

117.

Id.

118.
119.

Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. The New York Domestic Relations Law provides that "either

Id.

120.
parent may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such
minor child brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the court . ..
may award the natural guardianship, charge and custody of such child to either
parent... as the case may require." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70(a) (McKinney
1999 & Supp. 2001-02).
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same sex. In two earlier cases, the California Court of Appeals
denied visitation rights to women who had cohabited with the
natural mother of a child conceived through artificial
insemination. 121
In In re Interest of Z.J.H.,122 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin refused to recognize a coparenting agreement between
the plaintiff, Wendy L. Sporleder, and her lesbian former partner,
Janice Hermes, and denied visitation rights to Sporleder.
The
parties in Z.J.H., who had lived together for eight years, arranged
for Hermes to adopt a child.124 They agreed that if they separated,
they would resort to mediation to determine the child's physical
125
custody, with liberal visitation rights for the non-custodian.
After the parties separated, Hermes sued for visitation and
enforcement of the coparenting agreement. 126 The circuit court of
appeals denied relief, rejecting all of the legal theories that
Sporleder advanced.
In its decision affirming the lower court's judgment, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed out that in the absence of a
showing that a natural parent was unfit, or other extraordinary
circumstances, a nonparent could not obtain custody.' 27 The
applicable statute allowed visitation petitions "by a grandparent,
greatgrandparent, stepparent, or person who has maintained a
relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child,"
when visitation is in the child's best interest.' 28 The court cited
earlier case law in Wisconsin that had declared that the statute was
121.
See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App. 1990)
(declining legal recognition of parent-child relationship of nonbiological lesbian
coparent); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522-23 (Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert custody or visitation claim
against former partner); see also West v. Superior Ct., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160,
162-64 (1997) (refusing to recognize standing of lesbian former coparent)
(citing Curiale,272 Cal. Rptr. at 521-22).
122.
471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
123.
Id. at 204.
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
126. Id.
127.
Id. at 205.
128.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 2001); see Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d
at 208 (explaining legislative intent and pertinent case law), overruled by In re
Custody of H.S.H.- K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
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709

applicable only in cases where an underlying legal action affects
the family unit. The court found that the parties' agreement was
not consistent with the legislative intent of the custody and
visitation statutes, and also refused to hold that Hermes was
equitably estopped from denying that Sporleder was the child's
parent.
Not long after the Wisconsin Supreme Court's unequivocal
decision in Z.J.H., however, appellate courts in several states
began to recognize visitation claims by lesbian former coparents,
sometimes explicitly rejecting both the holdings and the reasoning
of earlier cases that had denied such claims. In A.C. v. C.B.,' 3 ° for
example, the New Mexico Court of Appeals declined to find that
an oral coparenting agreement between the mother of a child
conceived by artificial insemination and the mother's female
companion was unenforceable as a matter of law. 131 The court
explicitly cited and implicitly rejected the holding in Z.J.H. that a
coparenting agreement was void as against public policy, and
remanded the case to the trial court for a 3 hearing
on whether
2
visitation was in the best interest of the child.1
In a more surprising development, a mere four years after
its decision in In re Interest of Z.J.H., 13 3 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin reconsidered its position on visitation rights for lesbian
partners of legal parents and did a complete about-face. In In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 134 Sandra Holtzman sought court-ordered
custody of or visitation with the child of Elsbeth Knott, her lesbian
former partner. 35 As in its earlier decision, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the state's visitation statute did not apply
because the legislature intended
that the statute apply only in
36
cases.'
marriage dissolution
Despite the absence of legislative authority to support the
decision, the court declared that it was not the legislature's intent
129.

130.
131.
132.
1991)).
133.
134.
135.
136.

Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 211, 212.

829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 663-64.
Id. at 664 (citing In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 211 (Wis.
471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
Id. at 422.
Id. at 424.
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for the statute to "be the exclusive provision on ',visitation," nor that
"it supplant or preempt the courts' long recognized equitable
power to protect the best interest of a child by
ordering visitation in
37
circumstances not included in the statute."

The court, asserting that it was "[m]indful of preserving a
biological or adoptive parent's constitutionally protected interests
and the best interest of a child," held that for a trial court to
determine whether visitation is in the best interest of a child, a
petitioner must prove both her "parent-like relationship" with the
child as well as "a significant triggering event justifying state
intervention in the child's relationship with a biological or
adoptive parent."' 138 The court set out four requirements that1 39a
party must satisfy to show that a parent-like relationship exists.
The party must first show that the "biological or adoptive parent
consented to, and fostered" the relationship. 140 Second, the child
and the parent must have lived in the same household.' 4 1 Third, the
party must have undertaken, without expecting payment,
significant responsibility for such parental obligations as child
care, education, development, and contribution toward child
support. 142 Finally, the party's parental role must have been for a
long enough time 1to43 establish "a bonded, dependent relationship
parental in nature."
With respect to the requirement of a significant triggering
event, the party seeking court ordered visitation must show that the
parent substantially interfered with the parent-like relationship and
that the party sought a visitation order within a reasonable time
after this interference. 144 In sum, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that if the party seeking visitation proves the four elements of
a parent-like relationship, togetheri with a significant triggering
event, and a petition for visitation is made within a reasonable
time, the trial court may determine whether visitat !n is in the best
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 424-25 (emphasis added).
Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 435.

140.

Id.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 436.
Id.
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interest of the child. 45 The court
remanded the case to the trial
46
court for a best interests hearing.1
The decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, together
with later decisions by the highest courts of Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania, may portend that the tide has turned and
that courts will become increasingly sympathetic to petitions for
court ordered visitation by lesbian former coparents. In E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 47 for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held, in
a case of first impression, that the Probate Court did not abuse its
discretion in granting visitation rights to a de facto parent because
visitation was in the best interest of the child. 1 48 The court
conceded that there was no statutory authority whatsoever for
granting visitation rights to one claiming to be in a parent-like
position. 49 What is more, the court recognized that the best
interest standard is amorphous.150 Nevertheless, following
Wisconsin's lead, the court declared that the Probate Court's51
equity jurisdiction provided authority for a visitation award.'
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff who had shared a
relationship with the child's natural mother
for thirteen years was a
152
family.
nontraditional
a
in
de facto parent
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, employing somewhat
153
different reasoning, reached a similar result in V.C. v. M.J.B.
The court concluded that plaintiff's functioning as psychological
parent was sufficient to satisfy "the 'exceptional circumstances'
category
(occasionally
denominated
as
extraordinary
circumstances) that has been recognized as an alternative basis for
a third party to seek custody and visitation of another person's
145.
Id. at 435.
146. Id. at 437; see also J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321-22 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that lesbian former partners lived together in
nontraditional family with child and concluding relationship entitled plaintiff to
seek parental custody rights).
147.
711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999).
148.
Id. at 893-94.
149.
Id. at 889.
150.
Id. at 890.
151. Id.at 889-90.
152.
Id. at 892-93.
153.
748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3096 (Oct. 10,
2000).
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child." 154 To determine the circumstances under which a party
might establish psychological parenthood, the court, again without
statutory authority, applied the same test that established de facto
parenthood as enunciated by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in In
re Custody of H.S.H.-K. 55
'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also weighed in on
the issue of visitation rights for lesbian coparents in T.B v.
L.R.M.156 The facts in T.B. present a virtual mirror image of the
cases just discussed in that the plaintiff was the former lesbian
partner of a woman whose child was conceived through artificial
insemination and who shared the responsibilities of child
rearing.157 After the relationship ended, the plaintiff sought partial
custody and visitation with the child. 158 The court conceded that
there was a "stringent test for standing in third-party suits for
visitation or partial custody due to respect for the traditionally
strong right of parents to raise their children as they see fit," and
that "courts generally find standing in third-party visitation and
custody cases only where the legislature specifically authorizes the
cause of action." 159 Despite the lack of legislative authority, the
court decided that it was proper to allow
such an action where a
160
child.
the
to
parentis
party stood in loco

154.
748 A.2d at 549.
155.
Id. at 551; see Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995);
see also S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000). But see Titchenal
v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997).
156. 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001).
157.
Id. at 914-15.
158.
Id. at 915.

159.

Id. at 916.

160.

Id. The recently published American Law Institute's PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, in its
definitions of parent by estoppel and de facto parent, appears to accept, in
substance and effect, the approach set out in the decisions just discussed in
Wisconsin, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. See PRINCIPLES, sec.
2.03. For a thoughtful and sympathetic treatment of the ALl principles, see

James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Theory of the Family: The American
Law Institute's Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV.
923 (2001).
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Ell. THE DIMENSIONS OF TROXEL
A.

The Decision of the Court

InJune of 2000 the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Troxel v. Granville,16 1 responded to a constitutionally grounded
attack on the grandparent visitation statute of the State of
Washington. 162 The Court in Troxel, affirming the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court, held that the state statute, as applied,
was an unconstitutional infringement on "the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and
163
control of their children."'
The parents in Troxel, who never married, had two children
born out of wedlock. 164 In time, the parents separated and the
children's father regularly visited them in the home of his parents,
the children's paternal grandparents. 165 The children's father
committed suicide, and their mother subsequently decided to limit
the paternal grandparents' visitation to one short visit each
month. 166 The grandparents then sued for more liberal visitation
under the state grandparent visitation statute. 167 The statute in
question provided: "Any person may petition the court for
visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody
proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person
when visitation may serve the best interests of the child whether or
' 168
not there has been any change of circumstances."
In an opinion joined by a plurality of the Court, Justice
O'Connor described the statute as "breathtakingly broad," noting
that the statutory language "effectively permits any third party
seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning
visitation of the parent's children to state-court review.' ' 169 Further,
161.

530 U.S. 57 (2000).

162.

Id.; see WASH. REv. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1997).

163.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66-67.

164.

Id. at 60.

165.

Id.

166.

Id. at 60-61.

167.
168.
169.

Id. at 61.
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
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the statute "places the best-interest determination solely in the
hands of the judge," 170 whose view will prevail, without requiring
the court to afford any presumption of validity or, indeed, any
weight to a parent's decision that visitation would not be in the
best interest of the child. 171 Thus, Justice O'Connor observed, "in
practical effect, in the State of Washington a court can disregard
and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning
visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision files a
visitation petition, based
solely on the judge's determination of the
' 172
child's best interests."
Turning to the facts in the trial record, the plurality pointed
out that there were no special factors to justify state interference
with the parent's "fundamental right to make decisions concerning
the rearing of her two daughters."' 173 There was, for example,
neither an allegation nor a finding that the children's mother was
unfit, an important factor because of the "presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children."' 174 Not only did
the trial court fail to give special weight to the mother's
determination of the best interests of her daughter, but it also
effectively placed on a fit parent "the burden of disproving that
' 75
visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters."'
Accordingly, the Court determined that "[t]he decisional
framework employed by the [Washington] Superior Court directly
contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in
the best interest of his or her child."' 176 The plurality concluded:
As we have explained, the Due Process Clause
does not permit a State to infringe on the
fundamental right of parents to make childrearing
decisions simply because a state [trial] judge
believes a "better" decision could be made. Neither
the Washington nonparental visitation statute
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.

174.

Id.

175.
176.

Id. at 69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 68.

Id.
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generally-which places no limits on either the
persons who may petition for visitation or the
circumstances in which such a petition may be
granted-nor the Superior Court in this specific
case required anything more. Accordingly, we hold
that [the statute],
as applied in this case, is
77
unconstitutional.
Lest there be any doubt, the plurality explicitly noted that
its decision rested "on the sweeping breadth of [the Washington
statute] and the broad unlimited power in this case," but declined
to consider "the primary constitutional question passed on by the
Washington Supreme Court-whether the Due Process Clause
requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of
harm or potential of harm to the child as a condition precedent to
granting visitation."' 178 Rather, because state courts adjudicate
visitation standards case-by-case, the Court was "hesitant to hold
that specific nonparental visitation
statutes violate the Due Process
179
matter."
se
per
a
Clause as
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Souter pointed out that
the Court had "long recognized that a parent's interests in the
nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children
are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 80 He noted, however, that the Court's
earlier decisions had "not set out exact metes and bounds to' 8the
1
protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his child."'
In a separate opinion, Justice Thomas also concurred in the
judgment, and expressed agreement with the plurality "that this
Court's recognition of a fundamental right of parents
to direct the
' 82
upbringing of their children resolves this case."'
177.

Id. at 72-73.

178.

Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring).

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.at 78.
Id. at 80 (Thomas,J., concurring). Justice Thomas concluded:
Our decision in Pierce v.Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), holds that parents have a fundamental constitutional
right to rear their children, including the right to determine
who shall educate and socialize them. The opinions of the
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Justice Stevens, in his dissent, while commending the
Court's wisdom in "declin[ing] to endorse either the holding or the
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washington," asserted "the
Court would have been even wiser to deny certiorari." ' 183 Justice
Stevens went on to note that the Court's decisions "leave no doubt
that parents have a fundamental liberty in caring for and guiding
their children, and a corresponding privacy interest-absent
exceptional circumstances-in doing so without the undue
interference of strangers to them and to their child."' 184 Most
notably, Justice Stevens further observed:
There is at a minimum a third individual, whose
interests are implicated in every case to which the
statute applies-the child ....
While this Court has not yet had occasion to
elucidate the nature of a child's liberty interests in
preserving established familial or family-like bonds,
it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent
parents and families have fundamental liberty
interests in preserving such intimate relationships,
so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too,
must their interests be balanced in the equation. At a
minimum, our prior cases recognizing that children
are, generally speaking, constitutionally protected
actors require that this Court reject any suggestion
that when it comes to parental rights, children are so
much chattel. The constitutional protection against
arbitrary state interference with parental rights
plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a
right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate
standard of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to
infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State of
Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest-to
say nothing of a compelling one-in second-guessing a fit
parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties. On
this basis, I would affirm the judgment below.

Id. at 80.
183.
184.

Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 87.
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should not be extended to prevent the States from
protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of
parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an
interest in the welfare of the child.185
Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded that "the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves room for
States to consider the impact on a child of possibly arbitrary
parental decisions that186neither serve nor are motivated by the best
interests of the child."'

Justice Scalia, also dissenting in a separate opinion,
recognized the rights of parents to direct their children's
upbringing as among the inalienable rights proclaimed in the
Declaration of Independence and also among the "'othe[r rights]
retained by the people' which the Ninth Amendment says the
Constitution's enumeration of rights 'shall not be construed to
deny or disparage." ' 187 Justice Scalia asserted, nevertheless, that if
the Court should vindicate such parental rights, which are not
enumerated in the Constitution, it would "be ushering in a new
regime of judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, family
law." ' 88 Justice Scalia concluded, "I have no reason to believe that
federal judges will be better at this than state legislatures; and state
legislatures have the great advantages of doing harm in a more
circumscribed area, of being able to correct
their mistakes in a
' 189
flash, and of being removable by the people."
The final dissenter, Justice Kennedy, although agreeing
with much of Justice Stevens's opinion, dissented in a separate
opinion and averred that he would have remanded the case for
further proceedings. 19 Justice Kennedy faulted the Washington
court, not only for finding the statute facially unconstitutional, but
also for requiring a showing of harm in every case. 19 1 Justice
Kennedy objected to the Washington court's "conclusion that the
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 86-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 91.
Id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id. at 94-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

Id.
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Constitution forbids the application of the best interests of the child
standard in any visitation proceeding," stating:
My principal concern is that the holding seems
to proceed from the assumption that the parent or
parents who resist visitation have always been the
child's primary caregivers and that the third parties
who seek visitation have no legitimate and
established relationship with the child. That idea, in
turn, appears influenced by the concept that the
conventional nuclear family ought to establish the
visitation standard for every domestic relations
case. As we all know, this is simply not the
structure or prevailing condition in many
92
households. 1
Noting the "almost universal adoption of the best interests
standard for visitation disputes, 193 Justice Kennedy counseled that
"[t]he protection the Constitution requires ... must be elaborated
with care, using the discipline and instruction of the case law
system" 194 with the reminder that "family courts in the 50 states
confront these factual variations each day, and are best situated to
' 95
consider the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues that arise."'
B. The Impact of Troxel
In response to the question "What has Troxel wrought?" the
better part of wisdom suggests that one should offer only the most
tentative and speculative response at best. Within months of the
Supreme Court's decision in Troxel, state courts loosed a deluge of
opinions citing, discussing, and either applying or distinguishing
the Court's holding. One should note that many of the court
opinions that cite Troxel have the most tenuous relevance, if any at
196
all, to the issue that the Court addressed.
192.

Id.
at 98.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.

Id.
See, e.g., Cent. Tex. Nudists v. County of Travis, No. 03-00-00024-
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The Troxel opinion obscures more than it illuminates the
question of whether a given state's grandparent visitation statute,
or any third-party visitation statute for that matter, will survive
constitutional scrutiny. If one needs evidence beyond the six
opinions of the Justices to support this proposition, one finds it in
the conflicting state court decisions that purport to apply the
197
teaching of Troxel. Decisions by the highest courts in Florida,
Illinois, 198

Iowa, 199

Kansas, 2° °

Maine, 2° 1 Mississippi, 20 2

and

Oklahoma 2° 3

are illustrative of the widely variant opinions that
purport to rely on Troxel or take its holding into account. While
space limitations will not permit detailed discussion of all of these
cases, the following decisions illustrate the mischief of Troxel.
In Lulay v. Lulay,204 the maternal grandmother sought
visitation with three minor children whose divorced parents had

joint custody.

205

The applicable statute, 206 as interpreted by the

court, "permit[ted] a grandparent to file a petition for visitation

CV, 2000 WL 1784344, at *8 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2000) (holding that county
park rules that banned children's access to clothing-optional park did not violate
parents' due process rights to direct the upbringing of their children); Cooper v.
United States Ski Ass'n, 32 P.3d 502, 511 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
release signed by parent of child who subsequently sustained serious injuries
was valid and enforceable against the child).
197.
See Belair v. Drew, 770 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2000). The Florida opinion
was unexceptional in light of the court's holdings prior to the Troxel decision.
See, e.g., Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2000) (finding to be
unconstitutional a statutory provision that allowed grandparent visitation with a
child born out of wedlock); Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 516-17 (Fla.
1999) (holding unconstitutional a provision concerning grandparent visitation
when one or both of the child's parents are dead); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d
1271 (Fla. 1996) (finding that a statutory provision relating to grandparent
visitation with child living with both parents was unconstitutional).
198.
See Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521 (I11.
2000).
199.
See Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2001).
200.
See Kan. Dep't of Soc. and Rehab. Servs. v. Paillet, 16 P.2d 962
(Kan. 2001).
201.
See Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000).
202.
See Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 2001).
203.
See Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla. 2000).
204.
739 N.E. 2d 521 (I11.
2000).
205.
Id. at 523.
206.

See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607(b)(1) (West 1999).
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where the grandparent's own child... objects to the visitation. 2 °7
The court concluded that the statute, as applied, was "an
unconstitutional infringement on [the parents'] fundamental liberty
interest in raising their
children" and was, therefore,
20 8
unconstitutional as applied.
In Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitative
Services v. Paillet,2°9 the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas
is to the same effect as the Lulay decision in Illinois. In Paillet,as
in Troxel, the father of the minor child had died suddenly, in
210
Troxel by suicide and in Paillet in a car accident.
Here, the
grandparents sought visitation with their grandchild pursuant to a
statute that allowed a court to grant reasonable visitation rights to
the grandparents of an unmarried minor child "upon a finding that
the visitation right would be in the child's best interests and when a
substantial relationship between the child and the grandparent has
been established., 211 The court stated:
The trial court made no presumption, as
required by Troxel, that a fit parent will act in the
best interests of his or her child. In this case, the
operative presumption seems to have been that a fit
parent would not have denied visitation, which
justified the trial court's substituting its judgment in
determining the child's best interests. 212
The court also criticized the decision of the intermediate
appellate court as contrary to Troxel, stating:
Likewise, the Court of Appeals implicates the
presumption that a fit custodial parent makes
decisions in the best interests of the child. It would
allow a judge to call into question any parental
decision which results in rejecting or limiting a
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 534.
Id.
16 P.2d 962 (Kan. 2001).
Id. at 964.
Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (2000).
Paillet, 16 P.3d at 970.
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grandparent's visitation. The Court of Appeals'
decision essentially circumvents the presumption
that a fit parent makes decisions in the best interests
of his or her child. Such a decision would not allow
a fit parent to limit a grandparent's visitation
without losing the presumption that the parent is
making the decision in the best interests of the
child.213
Because the Court in Troxel had declined to decide whether
particular grandparent visitation statutes were facially violative of
due process, the court in Paillet found the Kansas2 14statute to be
unconstitutional only as applied to the case before it.
The highest courts of Maine 215 and Mississippi, 21 6 each
having addressed their states' visitation statutes subsequent to the
Troxel decision, encountered no apparent difficulty in finding the
statutes to be constitutional. In Rideout v. Riendeau,2 17 a case of
first impression, the Supreme Court of Maine, in the course of
addressing an attack on the Maine grandparent visitation statute,
emphasized that the Supreme Court, while declaring the
Washington statute unconstitutional, "did so on the limited facts
and law before it, leaving for another day a constitutional analysis
of statutes with more carefully established protections of parents'
fundamental rights. 218 Nevertheless, the Maine court extracted
from Troxel clear guidance on important points as follows:
First, [t]he liberty interest at issue in this casethe interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court. The fundamental right of parents to direct the
care and upbringing of their children does not
disappear in the face of a third party's request for
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 970-71.
Id. at 971.
See Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000).
See Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 2001).
761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000).
Id. at 297.
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visitation with the children. Second, the best
interests of the child standard, standing alone, is an
insufficient standard for determining when the State
may intervene in the decision making of competent
parents. And finally, because of the "presumption
that fit parents act in the best interests of their
children," trial courts must accord special weight to
parents' decisions and objections regarding requests
21 9
for third-party visitation.
In light of these principles, the Maine court turned to the
provision of the Maine statute that permitted a grandparent to
petition for visitation when "[tihere is a sufficient existing
relationship between the grandparent and the child. 22° The court
held that in this case the grandparents had acted as parents of the
children for a significant period of time and, therefore, "the
Grandparents Visitation Act serves a compelling state interest in
addressing the children's relationship with the people who have
cared for them as parents." 221 Further, the court found that
"[b]ecause the Act is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling
interest, it may be applied in this case without violating the
222
Constitutional rights of the parents."
Like the provision in Maine, the Mississippi statute that
governs grandparent visitation also withstood a challenge on
constitutional grounds in the state's highest court in Zeman v.
Stanford.223 In Zeman, the father of two minor children was
awarded sole custody after the divorce. 2 24 The children's mother
was granted reasonable visitation, which was restricted after her
imprisonment in Arkansas for attempted murder and other
crimes. 225 From the time of the children's birth, the maternal
grandparents enjoyed a relationship with them, including regular
219.
220.
1998)).
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 299 (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1803(1)(B) (West
Rideout, 761 A.2d at 303.
Id.
789 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 2001).
Id. at 799.
Id.
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723

Sunday dinners, Christmases, and birthday celebrations with the
children's cousins. 226 After the children's father curtailed these
visits to one weekend a month,
including,
•
227 overnight visitation, the
• .
grandparents sued for visitation rights. The trial court granted
visitation rights to the grandparents "based on the fact that a viable
relationship had been established between the [grandparents] and
the children8 and that it would be in the best interests of the
22
children."
The court reviewed its own earlier decision finding the
state's grandparent visitation was constitutional.229 In response to
the father's reliance on Troxel in support of his challenge to the
statute on constitutional grounds, the court stated:
The statute in Troxel swept too broadly by
permitting any person to petition at any time with
the only requirement being that the court find that
visitation serves the best interest of the child. In
contrast, this Court . . . specifically requires the
Chancellor to consider certain factors before
awarding visitation in order to ensure that parents
are not deprived of their right to rear their children
and determine230 their children's care, custody, and
management.
Accordingly, the court held that the limitations that it had
placed on the statute in the past resulted in a reading of the statute
that was not fraught with the excessive breadth of the statute
in
231
Troxel and that the father's constitutional attack lacked merit. 2 32
In addition to Mississippi, the highest courts of Georgia
and Oklahoma 233 were compelled to revisit the issue of
grandparent visitation after the Troxel decision, and in each case
the court adhered to the position it had assumed prior to Troxel.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 800.

Id.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 803 (reviewing Martin v. Coop, 693 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1997)).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
See Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).
See Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla. 2000).
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Clark v. Wade234 involved appeals in two companion cases, in
which the trial court, in each case, awarded custody to the father of
a child who had lived with grandparents for a substantial period of
time. 235 In the course of a lengthy opinion, the court cited its earlier
holding that the state's grandparent visitation law was
unconstitutional under both the United States and Georgia
Constitutions because of its failure to require a showing of harm
before a court could grant visitation.236
The court then noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision
last term in Troxel v. Granville raises the question whether we
correctly interpreted federal constitutional law as requiring a
showing of harm to the child before a state may intervene in the
parent's right to raise his or her family." 237 In response to this
question, the court concluded:
In enacting the parent-third party custody
statute, the Georgia General Assembly avoided the
constitutional defects that the U.S. Supreme Court
plurality found in the Washington visitation statute.
First, [the Georgia statute] expressly limits third
parties who may seek custody to a specific list of
the child's closest relatives, including an adoptive
parent. Second, the statute defers to the fit parent's
decision on custody by establishing a rebuttable
presumption in favor of parental custody. What is
left open for judicial interpretation is how to
determine that an award of custody to the third
party "is for the best interest of the child or children
and will best
promote their welfare and
238
happiness."
The court then narrowly construed the statutory best
interest of the child standard as meaning "that the third party must
234.
235.
236.
1995)).
237.
238.

544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 105 (citing Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (Ga.
Id. at 105-106.
Id. at 107 (citations omitted).
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prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer
physical or emotional harm if custody were awarded to the
biological parent," 239 and "that an award of custody to [the
third
240
happiness."
and
welfare
child's
the
promote
best
will
party]
In Neal v. Lee,241 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
observed that the facts in the case before it were similar to those in
Troxel, in that in both cases the father of the child was deceased
and the mother was the surviving parent. 242 The court reaffirmed
its decision in Herbst v. Sayre,243 which required a showing of
harm or potential harm for the imposition
of grandparent visitation
244
despite the objection of fit parents. The court observed that it is
not clear after Troxel whether the United States Constitution
requires a showing of harm or potential harm for imposing
grandparent visitation over fit parents' objections; 245 but the
holding in Herbst, requiring a showing of harm or potential harm
to the child before reaching the child's24 6 best interests, is not
affected by the Court's decision in Troxel.
It is plain, then, that state courts have neither found
agreement with respect to the teaching of Troxel nor have they
applied it in any way that can be readily characterized. At this
point, the most that one can say with any confidence is that Troxel
has neither advanced nor reinforced long-standing principles of
family autonomy and parental authority despite the plurality's
citation of earlier cases that established those principles.

239.

Id. at 108.

240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
14 P.3d 547 (Okla. 2000).
Id. at 549.
971 P.2d 395 (Okla. 1998).
Id.
Neal, 14 P.3d at 550.
Id.

244.

245.
246.

